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Abstract 
 
Our paper is a contribution to the literature exploring the patterns and determinants of 
smallholders’ adoption of food standards. This case study focuses on the adoption of  
GlobalGAP by small-scale fresh mango producers in Peru. Based on primary data surveys, we 
find that a few smallholders comply with the standards because of the support received from 
exporters. The latter offers contract farming, including technical advice and the annual 
certification costs. Therefore, the paper underlines the key role of exporters in Peru as 
intermediaries and organizers in the way smallholders may participate in private standards in 
agrifood value chains. 
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Introduction 
 
The last two decades have witnessed unprecedented changes in the agrofood sector through the 
proliferation of standards in international agricultural trade. After a period during which the 
states of developed countries actively implemented food safety standards (this has been 
exacerbated by a series of food scandals (Henson and Caswell 1999)), private food standards 
have rapidly penetrated agrofood markets (Reardon and Farina 2001). Expanding beyond their 
initial tiny market niche, they attend to rising consumer concerns regarding the conditions of 
production and trade of the goods they buy (Jaffee and Henson 2004). These voluntary standards 
on sustainable production generally combine a mixture of food safety, environmental, and social 
dimensions, while an inherent emphasis is given to product traceability. Consequently, standards 
not only affect the quality of final products, but also the whole organization of the supply chain 
(Reardon et al. 2000; Thorpe and Bennett 2004; Hammoudi et al. 2009). This significant change 
raises new opportunities and challenges for small export-oriented farmers in developing 
countries and has implications for agricultural development programs and policies. 
 
The pattern of new standard adoption in developing countries has recently received much 
attention from economists. A wide range of empirical literature argues that standards may act as 
a barrier to market access for smallholders: the stringent conditions tend to lead to the exclusion 
of smallholders and the inclusion of larger farmers (Key and Runsten 1999; Dolan and 
Humphrey 2000; Escobal et al. 2000; Reardon et al. 2003; Augier et al. 2005; Vandermeer 2006; 
Unnevehr 2008; Fuchs et al. 2011). In fact, compliance with standards often requires 
considerable human, physical, financial, informational, and network resources. Lack of access to 
these resources and the certification costs are the most common factors explaining the non-
compliance of smallholders with standards (Vorley and Fox 2004; Hatanaka et al. 2005; Henson 
and Jaffee 2006). On the contrary, some less pessimistic studies find positive effects, arguing 
that standards can be a catalyst for upgrade by improving farming techniques and product 
quality, thereby allowing them to participate in high-value added chains (Cocks et al. 2003; 
Henson and Jaffee 2008; Lee et al. 2010). Smallholders may be included in the high-standard 
market thanks to a contract-basis with the agro-exporters (Chemnitz 2007a; Chemnitz et al. 
2007b; Maertens and Swinnen 2009; Minten et al. 2009; Asfaw et al. 2010a; Henson et al. 2011). 
Finally, since it didn’t emerge any consensus among the different research works, it is becoming 
generally recognized that evidence is mixed (Henson and Jaffee 2008). Therefore, new debates 
arise over the degree to which compliance processes do indeed act to exclude smallholders 
(Henson and Humphrey 2009; Colen et al. 2012; Maertens et al. 2012) and with which 
conditions small farmers can really comply, pointing out both threshold capital requirements on 
the one hand and industry structure and institutional environment on the other hand that may 
greatly affect standard adoption by smallholders (Chemnitz et al. 2007b; Lee et al. 2010). 
 
In this paper, we focus on the private GlobalGAP standard adoption by small-scale producers of 
fresh mangos in Peru. Fresh fruit production may greatly contribute to poverty reduction, thanks 
to the high labor intensive requirement and the high capita income generated (Lumpkin et al. 
2005). However the opportunities of the fruit sector in developing countries can be restrained, 
here again, by the proliferation of standards (Vorley and Fox 2004), such as the GlobalGAP 
standard, which is the most important standard in export horticulture in the international produce 
market (Henson et al. 2011). Peru is an interesting case to study the effects and the determinants 
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enabling the standard adoption, because GlobalGAP has become “quasi” mandatory for the fresh 
mango exportation to the European Union (EU) since 2007 (Zoss and Pletziger 2007; Bain 2010; 
Souza and Amato Neto 2010). Actually, this standard is not mandated by law and thus remains 
‘voluntary’, but the reality is that compliance with GlobalGAP has become an ‘entry ticket’ into 
EU (Campbell et al. 2006; Fox and Vorley 2006). Yet fresh mango is one of the major 
agricultural exports for Peru and two-thirds of mangos are exported to the EU.  
 
Kleinwechter and Grethe (2006) have previously studied the adoption of the EurepGAP standard 
in the mango export sector in Peru in 2004-2005 (Kleinwechter and Grethe 2006). They have 
shown that the first major barrier to adoption is linked to accessing information about the 
standard. Since exporting enterprises were the most informed actors, the adoption of the standard 
is mostly found in their activities through vertical integration. According to the results of 
Kleinwechter and Grethe (2006), small-scale producers did not comply with EurepGAP 
certification in 2004-2005. Our research seven years later shows evidence that today, a slight 
percentage of smallholders comply with GlobalGAP as well.  
 
Surveys with 228 small-scale mango producers were conducted from October 2010 to July 2011. 
Data was collected in the region of Piura, the main zone of mango production. Consistent with 
few others recent studies (Asfaw et al. 2009; Henson et al. 2011; Kersting and Wollni 2012), our 
findings show that the standard adopters comply with the standard thanks to the support of 
exporting companies through farming contracts, technical advice, and by paying the annual 
certification costs. Therefore, the inclusion of small-scale farmers ultimately depends on the 
compliance decision of exporters and their assistance to farmers in the compliance process.  
 
The objective of this paper is thus a contribution to the current debate to what extend 
international standards may tend to exclude small-scale farmers from high-value food markets, 
and with which conditions some of them can eventually comply. We take underlying the fact that 
the role of intermediaries is essential to understanding the upstream decision to adopt private 
standards. Nonetheless, since the adoption of the standard by smallholders is very recent, it was 
not possible in this paper to measure whether the standard adoption allows really small-scale 
producers to be included in a more lucrative market. 
   
The paper proceeds as follows: section two provides a background of mango production and 
trade in Peru and the evolving international trade towards standards; section three develops the 
empirical model and estimation strategy; section four describes the survey and data; section five 
presents and discusses the empirical findings; and section six concludes the paper. 
 
Peruvian Fresh Mango Export Sector and Standards 
 
Production and Trade 
 
According to the World Bank definition, Peru is a low middle income country with a GDP of 
US$ 152.8 billion and per capita income of US$ 9,200 in 2010 (Worldfactbook 2010). In Peru, 
agriculture is still a source of economic development. It accounts for 8 percent of the GDP and 
provides 23 percent of direct and indirect employment (Inei 2008). Fresh mango is one of the 
major agricultural exports. Since 1985 with the first exports to the US, the sector has grown at 
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remarkable rates. Between 2000 and 2010, the cultivated areas increased from nearly 18,700 
hectares to around 28,400 hectares and the production from 125,000 tons to 250,000 tons (Minag  
2010). Peru exports around 30 percent of its national production (105,724 tons in 2009/2010) and 
is the fifth largest mango exporter in the world. Fresh mangos are by far the most important of 
exported mangos (87 percent of exported mango volumes in 2009, according to customs). 
Exports go to both the EU (65%) and US (35%) markets, but it is only since 2006 that the EU 
has surpassed the US as the main destination market (Figures 1 and 2)(Gerbaud 2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of Peruvian mango exports in the EU and the US (quantity and value)  
since 2000 
Source. COMTRADE (2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Export of Peruvian mangos in the world in 2010 
Source. SENASA (2010). 
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For the EU market, Peru – the second largest supplier – competes with Brazil in November and 
December (Gerbaud  2010). Indeed the main mango harvested season is between November and 
March in the region of Piura where production is concentrated (around 70 percent of the national 
production and 90 percent of exported production). Varieties for domestic market (two thirds de 
the national production) and export market are nonetheless very segmented. The main mango 
varieties grown for the domestic market are the local variety Criollo, and the improved variety 
Edward. Improved varieties for export such as Kent (94.5 percent of export volumes) are not 
valued by the Peruvian consumers and Kent variety prices are substantially lower than those for 
the Edward or Criollo varieties on the domestic market. The domestic market alternative for 
Kent mango producers is thus not profitable; for them the international market is therefore the 
only lucrative market (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mango prices according to varieties and targeted market (in euro/ton). 
Source. According to the data from MINAG (2011). 
 
 
On the other hand, the monthly FOB prices for exportation of Kent mangos to the EU and to the 
US are nearly similar for both markets (Figure 4). Nevertheless, there are some monthly or 
annual variations due to the other competitors for the targeted market (for instance, the EU 
market price was higher than the US price in November 2010 because of the shortage of 
Brazilian mangos on the international market, which was not the case in November 2009 
(Gerbaud 2010). 
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Figure 4. Evolution of Peruvian mangoes price in EU and US since 2000 
Source. COMTRADE (2010). 
 
 
Nonetheless, Peruvian mango growers face multiple inhibiting factors to export. The first 
constraint to accessing an outside market is a minimum volume required by the buyer (at least 
one container of 20 tons). This explains why small-scale producers (on average hardly producing 
20 exportable tons) cannot export directly and work with exporters or form producer associations 
in order to get export market access. The second constraint is that the mango must meet 
commercial quality requirements (colour, appearance and size). The third constraint is that 
export-oriented producers require a phytosanitary certificate from the SENASA (Servicio 
Nacional de Sanidad Agraria del Peru) – the public agency in charge of eradication of the fruit 
fly. Lastly, the fourth constraint to accessing an outside market is due to the growing stringent 
non-tariff measures and private standards. 
 
Non-Tariff Measures from the EU Market and Private Standards 
 
For both the EU and the US markets, exports are required to respect the standard from Codex 
Alimentarius and maximum residual levels (MRL) for pesticides. Nevertheless, contrary to the 
US, the EU does not require hydrothermal treatments to kill fruit flies. Mangos exported to 
Europe are cleaned and then packed in 20 existing packing plants in Peru. Most of them are 
located in the Piura region. Barriers to trade in the EU are therefore much more relative to 
private standards: at the plant level, the HACCP is essential at the production level, organic 
certification has spread and GlobalGAP has become mandatory de facto since 2007 (Bain 2010; 
Souza et al. 2010; Zoss et al. 2007). Indeed, while European Retail Produce Good Agricultural 
Practices (EurepGAP) was developed by 13 European retailers, the Global Good Agricultural 
Practices (GlobalGAP) begin to have an expanding role as one of the major private standards in 
the international trade (Lee et al. 2010). Today, this standard is still not mandated by law and 
thus remains ‘voluntary’, but the reality is that compliance with GlobalGAP has become an 
‘entry ticket’ into EU (Campbell et al. 2006; Fox et al. 2006). 
 
As Chemnitz et al. (2007b) argue, the nature of the standard – namely the annual compliance 
cost, but also the type of capital required – may affect producers differently. The GlobalGAP 
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guideline ensures good agricultural practices focusing first on food-safety, but also a number of 
issues concerning environment quality (soil, water, and wildlife conservation), worker safety and 
hygiene, and traceability on the farm. The certificate includes some initial investments (such as 
toilets, canteens for workers, water taps, safety equipment, and storage facilities for agricultural 
inputs and outputs, respectively) that require substantial financial capital to upgrade the farm. It 
also entails annual costs for external inspection by a certification body. Finally, it requires that 
the producer knows how to read, write, and keep records – which means a high level of human 
capital.  
 
Producers have two options to obtain certification under the standard: they can apply 
individually or apply collectively for a producer group certificate. Group certification is often the 
only possibility for small-scale farmers to become certified since it allows reducing individual 
cost of compliance. 
 
In Peru, information on the GlobalGAP standard is relayed by government organizations, 
producer and exporter organizations, and NGOs. Concerning the cost of compliance, our 
interview results highlight a large variability of the compliance costs, ranging between 150 and 
US$ 833/ha1. This is influenced by the previous endowments in storage or other infrastructures 
and the technical level of the farm, but also by its size (since required infrastructure and technical 
levels are not size proportional). Some added costs are then spending for infrastructure 
maintenance. According to our first exploratory interviews with exporters, implementation costs 
remain the major constraint for farmers to adopt GlobalGAP standard. This is consistent with the 
Kersting and Wollni’s findings (2012). In addition, the fixed cost of annual inspection in Peru is 
US$ 2,000/year. This is high, all the more so without a premium in the product price. The size of 
an individual enterprise is thus a major determinant of standard adoption. According to 
interviews with supply chain’s experts from the Piura agricultural chamber, the minimum 
profitable size to individually implement GlobalGAP is around 20 ha.  
  
Export-Oriented Stakeholders  
 
In Peru, most of the mango producers are smallholders (less than 20 ha of total land, according to 
the national census categories): 85 percent of them have less than 20 ha of total land including 15 
percent who have less than five ha. This repartition and the rather small size of mango producers 
in Peru are due to the agrarian reform of 1969. In 2009, 1,627 producers were allowed to export 
their mangos by SENASA. Among these producers, 75 percent are smallholders (less than 20 ha 
of total land), 20 percent are medium farmers (from 20 to 50 ha), and 5 percent are large-scale 
farmers (more than 50 ha). They account for 30 percent, 30 percent, and 40 percent of exported 
produce, respectively (according to the data of Senasa, 2010). The mango-producing sector is 
little organized in Peru. According to an expert, this could be explained by the fact that there are 
lots of small producers and the mango season is very short, around three months.  
In 2009-2010, there were 106 fresh mango-exporting companies (Senasa, 2010). There is a rather 
medium concentration of exports in few exporting companies: the top 10 represent 46 percent of 
                                                          
1 In spite of a large variability in their results, Kleinwechter and Grethe (2006) calculate a compliance cost of 
US$145 /ha/year on average and US$9.51 /ton/year, that is 3.8 percent of the mango farm gate price. 
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the total export volume. However, when compared to the figures from 2005-2006 (Fulponi, 
2007), this concentration in the mango-exporting sector has decreased during these last five 
years, revealing a still very attractive and expandable market: in 2005 there were around 70 
mango exporters in Peru and the top six represented 54 percent; moreover the top one accounted 
in 2006 for 22.1 percent of the total fresh mango export and in 2010 only for 10.2 percent. 
Otherwise, there are still few foreign exporter enterprises (it seems there are only two for the 
moment) but since the sector has been attractive for foreign investments few years ago, we found 
Peruvian enterprises with a part of foreign capital (from the US, Colombia, Costa Rica, and so 
forth). Beyond attractive, the sector shows also a relatively low entry barrier since the 
concentration in the mango-exporting sector has decreased these last five years and the sector 
actors complain about the high number of small and very volatile exporter firms (60 percent treat 
less than 500 tons per year) that enter the market for short run market opportunities. These 
sporadic exporters are called “golondrinos” (meaning “swallows”). These firms, not demanding 
on quality and safety norms are subjected to the most border rejections. 
 
Large exporters often own packing or treatment plants and are generally targeting both the EU 
and US markets. They have easily enforced quality, traceability, and certified production – in 
particular GlobalGAP. Indeed, they mostly rely on their own production (from 50 to 250 ha) and 
still tend towards increased vertical integration, even though land has become very expensive 
nowadays2. However, there is large variability in mango production from year to year3. Thus, 
they generally complete their own production by purchasing from smaller farmers. Suzuki et al. 
(2011) also note, in their case study on pineapple exporters in Ghana, that this strategy is 
undertaken, at least in part, to shift quantity risks (Suzuki et al., 2011). Small-scale producers 
may thus have annual contracts (written or oral contracts, but hardly enforceable). Through these 
contracts, they steadily delegate harvests to the exporter (or a third party assigned to harvest on 
behalf of the packing plant), since it becomes very difficult to gather daily workers. In addition, 
in many cases, producers hardly have any access to credit to pay workers. A disadvantage to 
delegate harvests to the exporter is the high level of mangos discarded during the harvest – the 
discarded mango rate is on average 20 percent. Exporters are also in charge of carrying out 
transportation to the processing plant. Prices are rarely fixed and pay is often delayed. In some 
context, this type of contracts may be an option to assist small-scale farmers to achieve 
GlobalGAP certification (Asfaw et al., 2010b; Kersting and Wollni, 2012). 
 
Empirical Model and Estimation Strategy  
 
This paper questions to what extent international standards tend to exclude small-scale farmers 
from high-value food markets. The requirement of the GlobalGAP standard used in this case 
study can be considered an “external shock” to the EU export supply system. Indeed, while 
mango growers have seen a continuous positive growth in export dynamics since 2000, the new 
standard requirement may weaken many of them. We thus investigate the determinants of the 
adoption of GlobalGap by small-scale farmers. As Chemnitz et al. (2007) and Henson and Jaffee 
                                                          
2  Escobal et al. found the same dynamic in the asparagus industry in Peru ten years ago (Escobal et al., 2000) 
3 For example, the 2008-2009 season was disastrous in terms of production (due to agronomic reasons). Numerous 
producers mention a reduction of around 50 percent of their production level. 
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(2008) have already highlighted, the ability to comply with standards will depend on several 
factors at the country, market, and firm levels, as well as the specific food standards. Here, we 
have taken an essentially microeconomic approach, focusing on the determinants of farmer 
standard adoption at the farm level. We have characterized the country, the market, and the 
specificity of the GlobalGAP standard as an element of context in the section above. In this 
given context, we want to assess how farm characteristics determine farmers’ compliance with 
the GlobalGAP standard. We thus model the farmers’ decision whether or not to comply with the 
GlobalGAP standard as a standard static adoption decision, where adoption is determined by the 
incentives4 for and capabilities of farmers (Feder et al. 1985). 
 
Regarding incentives, the GlobalGAP standard may offer farmers more demand reliability in 
terms of volume and/or allow higher prices. In our case study, the incentives are in part implicit 
to standard adoption and are further determined by farm characteristics themselves (size, 
bargaining power, and so forth). Therefore these factors will not be directly entered into the 
implementation model. Regarding capabilities, meeting the GlobalGAP standard requirement 
may imply the presence of or the investment in some physical as well as human capital. The 
GlobalGAP standard requirement is therefore hypothesized as determining a threshold capital 
requirement, which suppliers must have in order to benefit from the standard opportunity.  
According to existing literature on the adoption of food quality standards, this threshold capital 
requirement may include physical capital (for examples, land, car, etc.), human capital (for 
examples, age, education, business experience), financial capital (for example, access to credit) 
and social and organizational capital (for example, group membership). Farmers with capital 
above this threshold capital requirement are expected to adopt the GlobalGAP standard if the 
incentives are there to continue to export for the EU market. Farmers with capital below this 
threshold capital requirement would be excluded from the GlobalGAP standard adoption and 
thus from the EU export chain.  
 
We can refer to a conceptual reduced-form model defining standard adoption as follows:  
 
For all i, we consider: 
 
 
 
GlobalGAP is a binary variable equal to one if the farmer i adopts the standard (and zero 
otherwise). Xi is a set of observed variables influencing the decision to adopt the GlobalGAP 
standard; other unobserved factors are summarized by the random variable εi.  
 
We draw on the literature in order to derive hypotheses about the expected influences of the 
independent variables. It is worth mentioning that, for the estimation, we used lagged 
independent variables referring to the farm capital before the decision to adopt GlobalGAP or not 
(we used variables from 2006 since GlobalGAP has been become almost mandatory to export to 
                                                          
4 Nonetheless, since the adoption of the standard by smallholders is very recent, it was not possible in this paper to 
measure whether the standard adoption allows really small-scale producers to be included in a more lucrative 
market. 
  Lemeilleur                                                                                                                                  Volume 16 Issue 4, 2013 
 
 
 2013 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IFAMA). All rights reserved. 
 
 
168 
the EU since 2007). These lagged independent variables are used to control whether the standard 
adoption is due to an initial threshold capital and, thus, to ensure independency of these 
variables. In addition, we use variables referring to the farmer relationships to other agents of the 
marketing channels.   
First, we assume that the standard adoption will mainly be determined by the farm’s capital, 
which represents internal farm resources and access to external resources. 
 
To capture the influence of human capital, we include the general household characteristics such 
as: 
 
- an educational level beyond primary school. A low-level of human capital, in particular 
management ability, is found in empirical studies as an obstacle to the implementation of 
high standards (Okello 2005; Reardon and Timmer 2007; Asfaw et al. 2010b; Kersting 
and Wollni 2012). Yet, the GlobalGAP standard requires farmers to keep in-depth 
records of all their practices on the farm; we thus expect that more educated farmers are 
more likely to adopt the standard. 
- experience as a farmer. The GlobalGAP standard requires high level of food safety and 
quality; it is hypothesized that farmer who have accumulate qualifications and build 
knowledge on producing mango over the years, may adopt the standard more easily. We 
test the experience squared as well, because we expect that older farmers (more 
experienced) won’t, on contrary, invest in new practices for mango production.  
 
Moreover, we take the physical capital into account by introducing farm characteristics such as: 
 
- land under Kent mangos in 2006. Many authors argue that some stallholder-specific fixed 
costs of standard certification tends to cost small farmers more than their larger peers 
with economies of scale and lower transaction costs (Jaffee et al. 2005; Henson and 
Humphrey 2009; Barrett et al. 2011). Therefore, we expect that farmers with large areas 
of Kent mangos in 2006 were more likely to adopt the standard. Moreover they have a 
high incentive to adopt GlobalGAP in order to maintain their access to the EU outlet for 
their high amount of mangos.  
- specialization in mango production in 2006 (land under mangos compared to total farm 
land area). Again, we expect that farmers who are more specialized in mango production 
in 2006, meaning that they are more dependent on mango revenue, are more likely to 
adopt the standard in order to maintain their access to the EU outlet.  
- age of the production trees under 10 years. The quantity and quality of mangos depend on 
the age of the trees. We introduce this variable, which could be seen as a fixed 
investment, since we suppose a potential effect on GlobalGAP adoption.   
- owning a mobile phone in 2006.  As mango harvests are delegated to the exporter, a high 
level of coordination and communication is needed. We suppose that farmers with mobile 
phones in 2006 were more likely to adopt GlobalGAP.  
- owning a car in 2006.  Farmers don’t have to transport mangos, nonetheless this variable 
should be interpreted as a proxy for the high level of the farm capital and the farmer’s 
wealth. Yet the GlobalGAP standard requires substantial financial capital to upgrade the 
farm. We suppose that wealthy farmers are more able to make initial investments and to 
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pay for GlobalGAP certification – with the risks included (if there is no return on 
investment) – than others. We also integrate variables describing organizational and 
social capital such as: 
- belonging to a producer organization. As we mentioned in the last section, producers 
have two options to obtain certification under the standard: either by applying 
individually or by applying collectively for a producer group certificate. In the case of 
small farmers who hold less than 20 ha, the standard adoption at the individual level 
seems difficult due to the fixed costs of compliance. The other option is thus that farmers 
organize themselves within producer organizations so as to comply collectively with 
standards. Moreover, forming producer groups may reduce costs at various levels (lower 
cost for external inspection, shared investments, and so forth) (Okello 2005; Narrod et al. 
2009; Asfaw et al. 2010a; Belton et al. 2011). One could expect more positive results 
from GlobalGAP adoption when farmers belong to producer organizations.  
- having had contracts with exporter in 2006. Annual contracts reveal confidence between 
producers and exporters. Since standard compliance often leads to stronger vertical 
coordination through farming contracts (Chemnitz 2007a; Chemnitz et al. 2007b; 
Maertens and Swinnen 2009; Minten et al. 2009; Asfaw et al. 2010a; Henson et al. 2011; 
Kersting and Wollni 2012). We expect that farmers who used to having contracts before 
2006 are more likely to enter in this kind of relationship and adopt GlobalGAP.  
Second, we assume that some variables referring to the market access will also determine 
standard adoption, such as:  
 
- the distance to the plant.  We suppose that farmers located far from the exporter plant are 
less likely to adopt GlobalGAP because of higher levels of transaction costs between 
them and exporters (less information, less confidence, and so forth). Literature underlines 
irregular market access (due to insufficient infrastructures or coordination problems) as a 
major obstacle to participating in the competitive market (Fafchamps et al. 2007; Barrett 
et al. 2011). Nonetheless, in our case study, this is the exporter who harvests. Therefore 
this variable is an exogenous variable that is more linked to the exporter’s decision than 
the producer’s one. This is a proxy of transaction costs perceived by exporter himself. In 
case where this variable comes statistically significant, that may reveal a selection from 
exporter side5.  
 
Each of these explanatory variables is hypothesized to ceteris paribus influence the probability 
of standard adoption. We then estimate a probit regression model to test the hypothesis 
concerning the determinants of the adoption decision model defined above. 
 
  
                                                          
5 Contrary to Kersting and Wollni (2012), we were not able to control for the potential selection bias. However they 
do not find evidence for a selection bias in their model and finally calculate a univariate probit model to estimate 
GlobalGAP adoption, such as we do in our case study. 
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Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Survey and Data 
 
This empirical study was led in the framework of the European NTM-Impact Project (www.ntm-
impact.eu), whose objectives include the analysis of the impacts of non-tariff measures (NTMs) 
from high-income countries – governmental regulations and private standards – on developing 
countries. Between October 2010 and May 2011, we undertook a survey of 213 mango producers 
in the main mango region of Piura, where over 90 percent of exported mangos originate. We 
focus our analysis here on small farmers with less than 20 ha and who represent 20-30 percent of 
mango exports and 70-80 percent of all mango producers. We randomly selected 19 villages 
located in Piura region where exporters’ plants are found. Within these villages, producer 
surveys were chosen randomly among the farmers growing Kent mangos (export-oriented) with 
holdings of less than 20 ha (that is small farmer for whom individual GlobalGAP certification 
might be unprofitable). Surveys were conducted on a face-to-face basis. The data collected 
through the questionnaire include: household and farm general characteristics, household assets, 
mango production and marketing behaviour, mango standard certifications (organic and 
GlobalGAP), other activities, changes and perceptions since GlobalGAP has been required by 
exporters. This sample of 213 farmers is representative of the total small farms in Piura. 
Following this first wave of surveys, we found only eight percent of the sample (18 observations) 
which has adopted the GlobalGAP standard. To investigate the statistically significance of the 
determinants of the GlobalGAP adoption, we need to increase the sample of standard adopters. 
For this reason, a second wave of surveys was thus conducted during July 2011 among small 
farmers who comply with GlobalGAP. A total of 15 farmers were interviewed in this second 
wave. At this stage, the selection process of the whole sample (238 producers) was not random.  
 
In addition to the farmer surveys, additional semi-structured interviews were conducted with 10 
exporters and other supply chain actors (promoting agencies, state actors, leaders of producer 
organizations, and so forth) to collect supplemental contextual data allowing better 
understanding of various aspects of the mango supply chain in Peru. Finally, this primary data 
was supplemented with price information. 
 
Characteristics of Farmers and Marketing Behaviors 
 
Within our whole sample, the average farm size is 8 ha, 3.3 ha of which is dedicated to mango 
production (of which 85 percent is Kent mangos). All producers grow varieties for the domestic 
market and personal consumption (an average of 15 percent of their total mango crop surface). 
Some small-scale producers also grow lemons (39%), cereals (21%), and cocoa (6%). Among 
respondents, 80 percent say that mangos are the most important product grown in terms of cash 
flow. Some small-scale producers are also day laborers at other farms (13%) or have off-farm 
income (14%). On average, they have grown mangos since 1997, but most of them started after 
2000, when exportation rose dramatically. Their distance from the nearest exporter plant is 
around 14 km. 
 
From the first wave of surveys, that is the random process that led to a representative sample of 
small farmers in the Piura region, 31 percent of farmers surveyed have heard about GlobalGAP 
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certification and only eight percent are GlobalGAP certified. GlobalGAP certified producers are 
scarce, as one could expect for smallholders.  
 
Thanks to the second waves of surveys, we collected data for 33 GlobalGAP adopters. In this 
sample of GlobalGAP adopters, the average certification date is 2009 (from 2007 to 2010). The 
compliance cost is US$ 2,000 per year (without any variability among respondents). The 
certificate is sometimes paid by the producers themselves (8%), but mostly by the exporter 
(56%) or a producer organization (33%). Initial investments (such as toilets, canteens for 
workers, water taps) are more often paid for by the producers (91%) including 15 percent of 
farmers who have used credit from rural credit banks. Among respondents, 76 percent have 
decided to follow training courses for GlobalGAP implementation offered by the INCAGRO 
Peru project (an organization supported by the Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture and the World 
Bank to promote innovation in agriculture and partnership between public and private 
initiatives).  
 
Table 1 compares producer characteristics according to standard adoption, using the student t-
test and the Pearson’s chi square test.  
 
As presented in Table 1, the average total land size of GlobalGAP adopters is significantly lower 
than the non-adopters. However, the average size of land under Kent mangos is significantly 
higher than their counterparts. Regarding volumes in 2009, there are no significant differences 
among the groups. One of the main characteristics of GlobalGAP adopters is that they are more 
specialized in export-oriented mango production (77 percent of their total land area is under Kent 
mango production compared to 52 percent for the others). Finally, household characteristics 
show that GlobalGAP adopters are more likely to be a little younger and more educated than 
non-adopters. Experience and family size do not show any difference between the two groups.  
 
Among variables related to market access, the distance is significantly lower for standard 
adopters. As we know that harvests are delegated to exporters, this could suggest that standard 
compliance may be more the result of an exporter’s decision rather than that of the farmer. Other 
variables related to relationships with buyers, such as contracts and advance payments, differ 
significantly: we find that 66 percent of the producers who adopt GlobalGAP rely on written 
contracts. Contracts and advance payments attest to close relationships with the buyers. In the 
case of GlobalGAP adopters, farmers are also more likely to receive technical advice from the 
buyer compared to the control group. Nonetheless, standard adopters’ buyers are not 
significantly more demanding in terms of commercial quality (color and weight) than those of 
their counterparts. Many empirical studies describe farming contracts as a key institutional 
arrangement in order to support smallholder participation in private standards (Jaffee and Henson 
2004; Minten et al. 2009; Asfaw et al. 2010a; Barrett et al. 2011). 
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Table 1. Characteristics of adopters and non-adopters: summary characteristics and statistical 
differences. 
 Non-globalGAP (n=195) GlobalGAP (n= 33) 
Farm characteristics   
Total land size 8.3 3.8*** 
Ratio of land size under Kent 0.52 0.77*** 
Volume of mangos 2009 25 21 
Household characteristics   
Age 56.2 50.8* 
Education level >primary school 0.45 0.66** 
Experience 15.72 13.72 
Children  (<15 years) 1.6 1.8 
Market access and relation w/ buyer   
Distance to plant 13.9 7.7*** 
Works only w/ 1 exporter 0.71 0.88* 
Has written contract 0.12 0.66*** 
Technical advice 0.36 0.87*** 
Advance payment 0.14 0.69*** 
Month is important for buyer 0.11 0.12 
Color is important for buyers 0.64 0.54 
Weight is important for buyers 0.54 0.54 
Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.1 (*) level of probability 
 
Results and Discussion  
 
Based on maximum likelihood estimations, Table 2 presents the probit estimators of the 
conceptual model. In our dataset, individuals adopting GlobalGAP are oversampled so that the 
sample mean is more than the population mean. We calculate the average marginal effects (that 
is the average behaviour of individuals, (Bartus 2005)) that automatically adjust for any weight 
used during the estimation. 
 
The high rate of pseudo-R² of the probit model indicates that there is probably a threshold level 
capital requirement, which farmers must have in order to adopt the GlobalGAP standard and 
enter in this high added-value chain.  
 
Regarding human capital component, we found that ceteris paribus the number of years that the 
farmers have been growing mangos significantly increase the likelihood that they will adopt the 
standard. An extra year of experience would increase the probability of adoption by almost five 
percent. More-experienced farmers might be more aware of business opportunities and seem to 
move quicker towards new high-level quality requirements. The effect of an extra year becomes 
smaller the longer the farmer does this activity, as shown by the significance of the squared term. 
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This corroborates our hypothesis that older farmers won’t invest in new practices for mango 
production. 
 
Regarding physical capital component, we found no evidence that having more land area under 
Kent mangos increases the probability of adopting GlobalGAP. However, the specialization in 
mango production is positively correlated to the GlobalGAP adoption. This is as expected 
(marginal effect of almost 10 percent), since the farmer portfolio is reduced and these farmers are 
more likely to adopt standards in order to maintain their access to the EU outlet. The age of 
mango trees is also a determinant of GlobalGAP adoption. Trees aged five to ten years have 
better potential in terms of mango production quality and quantity than older trees, which 
explains a positive effect on GlobalGAP adoption. Finally, owning a mobile phone is a strongly 
positively determinant to explain standard adoption (marginal effect of 13.5 percent), whereas 
owning a car is not significant. Indeed, according to the organization of the chain (farmer 
delegate harvest to exporters), communication appears more essential than transport facilities. 
Having a mobile phone is thus a critical capital requirement for farmers who want to adopt the 
standard.  
 
Table 2. Regression Estimation Results 
Dependant Variable: GlobalGAP Adoption     Coefficient Marginal 
Human capital (Household characteristics)   
Education level >primary school 0.297 4.016 
Experience as a farmer     0.369** 4.953 
Experience as a farmer squared  -0.009* -0.129 
Physical capital (Farm characteristics)   
Land area under Kent mangos in 2006             -0.037 -0.501 
Specialized in Kent mangos in 2006     0.736** 9.898 
Mango trees between 5 and 10 years old  0.655* 9.340 
Own a mobile phone in 2006      0.908*** 13.524 
Own a car in 2006    -0.599 -7.214 
Social capital    
Belong to a producer organization   0.700** 10.352 
Used to having contracts in 2006     1.058*** 16.973 
Financial capital   
Off-farm income in 2006    0.229 3.228 
Market access   
Distance to the plant    -0.171*** -2.304 
Constant             -3.735**  
Pseudo-R²              0.45  
N              201  
Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.1 (*) level of probability 
 
Regarding the social capital component, we found that farmers who are members of a producer 
organization are significantly (marginal effect of 10.35 percent) more likely to adopt GlobalGAP 
than their counterparts. In addition, when farmers have been used to having contracts, they are 
significantly more likely to adopt the standard (marginal effect of almost 17 percent).  
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Regarding access to external resources – namely financial capital through off-farm income – 
were not significant in predicting GlobalGAP adoption.  
 
Finally, at the minimum, findings on the different types of capital suggest that certification is 
non-random and underlines the relevance of a threshold capital requirement (experience, 
specialization, young mangos trees, mobile phones, producer organizations) that accounts for 
endogenous selection. 
 
Otherwise, we have assumed that some variables referring to market access, such as distance to 
the plant, will also ceteris paribus determine the standard of adoption. Estimation results show a 
strong negative correlation between the distance to the plant and the likelihood that the farmer 
will adopt the standard. An extra kilometre of distance to the plant would decrease the 
probability of adoption by 2.3 percent. Since it is the exporters who manage the harvest inside 
the mango farms and offer contract farming to small farmers for the GlobalGAP adoption, we 
think that the standard compliance may be more the result of an exporter’s decision rather than 
that of the farmer. Standard implementation may increase transaction costs and agency costs 
(namely moral hazard) for exporters who will thus prefer nearby farmers. In a second stage, 
farmers choose whether or not to adopt the standard. According to these findings, exporters 
might select their GlobalGAP suppliers on the basis of these latter’s distance to the plant and 
ability to become reliable suppliers over the long term (experienced, specialized, and used to 
respecting contracts). These farmers must also demonstrate their ability to deliver with short lead 
times (presence of mobile phone, distance to the plant). Moreover, adopters comply with the 
support from exporters most of time but also with the support of producer organizations. 
According to Barrett et al. (2011), membership in a farmer organization is an observable signal 
that helps the firms identify the best prospective suppliers because of the technical support, the 
economies of scale, the reduced transaction costs, and the group enforcement mechanisms.  
 
Exporters play thus a key role as intermediaries and organizers in agrifood value chains, by 
deciding who and how suppliers will meet buyers’ sophisticated demands. These results have 
been described in others cases (Kersting and Wollni 2012). Lee et al. (2010) argue that the 
influence of intermediaries on smallholders is particularly important in buyer-driven and 
producer-driven value chains. These cases are more beneficial to smallholders compared to 
bilateral oligopolies, where traders may be more vertically integrated. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper is a contribution to the debates on whether international standards tend to exclude 
small-scale farmers from high-value food markets. Drawing on a microeconomic approach, we 
investigated the determinants of small-scale farmers’ adoption of GlobalGAP. 
 
Data collected through a large number of surveys with small-scale export-oriented producers 
(228 surveys) show three main results: First, there is evidence that GlobalGAP adoption by 
smallholders exists, since eight percent of the representative sample is complying with 
GlobalGAP. Second, exporting companies support these farmers in complying with the standard 
through farming contracts, technical advice, and by paying the annual certification costs. This 
support allows small-scale producers to be included in the lucrative international market. 
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Therefore, while Kleinwechter and Grethe (2006) have shown previously that GlobalGAP-
certified exporter companies tend to increase the vertical integration of the mango production, 
we observe nowadays that a mixed picture of their mango supply exists thanks to contract 
farming, allowing the integration of small-scale farmers into the high standard market. 
Consistent with other outcomes (Henson and Jaffee 2008; Lee et al. 2010), our results show that 
GlobalGAP standard doesn’t act as a barrier for all the smallholders. Their inclusion depends 
thus on the exporter’s support. Third, nonetheless, farmers who are integrating into this supply 
chain seem to be selected according to two characteristics: they are more specialized in mango 
production (more than 80 percent of their land) and they are located closer to the exporter plant. 
Exporters may thus decrease transaction costs by selecting productive farmers close to their 
plants.  
 
This study aimed thus to contribute to the analysis of the conditions under which small-scale 
farmers are more likely to comply with a voluntary food standard. The latter is of interest to 
policymakers since Peruvian agriculture is a still source of economic development and represents 
a large source of employment. Adoption or not of growing international standards in different 
agricultural sectors is very important to analyse in order to develop adapted policy 
recommendations and support for farmers. However, the question is whether policymakers can 
do anything to facilitate the compliance of smallholders with new sustainable standards. While 
our results highlight that private firms may assist small capitally constrained and financially 
distressed farmers to adopt standard, we also agree with Cock et al.(2003), arguing that this 
assistance could be provided by third party facilitator, such as public aid agency. These authors 
have shown that the establishment of an integrated approach of assistance by public aid agency, 
covering product quality improvement program, product management, credit, leadership 
development, training in collective governance, and accountability, may allow groups in 
expanding ability of sustaining long term credible exchange relationships among producers and 
between producers’ organisation and exporters. Furthermore, others authors have shown that 
donors and development countries’ governments have identified the need for assistance and 
support of public-private partnerships with exporters (Humphrey 2008; Bignebat and Vagneron 
2011; Kersting and Wollni 2012). For instance, to ensure to spread smallholders’ compliance 
with international standards, the development of the public guidelines for good agricultural 
practices by product and the definition of a clear direction for technical assistance and support 
programs for small-scale farmers may be key elements of success (Jaffee and Henson 2004). 
 
Finally, to pursue this analysis further, it would be interesting to measure the income and poverty 
effects of such high-standard trade (or even labour market effects) on small-scale farmers. 
Nonetheless, to do that, we would need to go back to the very date of standard adoption by 
farmers (it requires at least a whole year to register the short-term effects on price and income). 
In addition, more consideration must been given to analyse how industry structure and 
institutional environment of a given country affect the implementation of compliance with 
private standards.  
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